This paper has provided a model framework of foreign assistance policy in the context of dynamic optimal control and investigated the environmental policies in LDCs that received some financial support from abroad. The model framework features a specific behavior of the social planner who determines the level of voluntary expenditure for preservation of natural environment. Because more financial needs for natural environmental protection means less allowance of growth-oriented investment, the social planner confronts a trade-off problem between economic growth and environmental preservation. To tackle with this clearly, we have built a dynamic model with two control variables: per-capita consumption and voluntary expenditure for natural environment. It has been proved that people in LDCs need a voluntary development of the eco-consciousness for better environmental situation. Because this leads to declining of the rate of economic growth, it may be justified that more foreign aid for domestic economic growth should be financed. By investigating some stability properties of the dynamic system, we have also reached an interesting proposition that the feasibility and effectiveness of the optimal control policy pursued by the social planner of LDCs depend on the people's consciousness towards natural environment.
INTRODUCTION
One of major topics in economics is to provide the adequate policy measures for the preservation of natural environment. For the most countries, it is very hard for the social planners to tackle with the environmental problem because they should re-allocate the scarce financial resources towards environmental preservation at the cost of diminishing economic growth.* However, it may be more serious for LDCs since their financial endowments are limited to compare with advanced economies. This accounts for existing international arrangements for foreign assistance from advanced countries to LDCs, leading to a motivation to study the property and effectiveness of such a foreign aid policy. In this paper, we shall investigate how contributions stemmed from the foreign aid work both for protecting natural environment and for raising income level. Many economists have debated about possible linkages between economic growth and the environmental preservation (see, for example, Kageson (1998) although it is mainly related to non-renewable resources). Economic growth and the environmental preservation still remain to be a complicated issue. In this paper, we shall feature a dynamic model for the optimization policy of LDCs that receives the financial and technological support directly from the advanced countries or via the international organizations. The model type of dynamic optimization employed here is a revised and complex version motivated by many papers including Huang and Cai (1994) , van del Ploeg and Lighthard (1994) , Rauscher (1994), Dasgupta and Miler (1995) , Mohtadi (1996) Smulders (1998) and Wirl (1999a) , for examples. Firstly we shall study a comparative statics to clarify how the foreign aid works for preserving natural environment and what kind of policy mix can be effective when there is *As Kageson (1998, esp. Chapter 17) has pointed out, it is still hard question how much the environmental difficulties are caused by fast growth. Moreover, it is also hard to find evidences how environmental protection costs like pollution abatement costs have a tendency to reduce economic growth.
ISSN 1026-0226 (C) 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd trade-off between economic growth and the environment. Secondly, we shall mention to the stability properties of the dynamic system. Because our system has two state variables, we shall incorporate a technical procedure into a text to discriminate the stability properties according to the Dockner's method provided by Dockner (1985) ."
The next section provides the basic model framework with regeneration function of the natural environment.
"An optimal environmental policy" section gives the optimal environmental policy and necessary conditions for dynamic optimality. After defining the long-run equilibrium conditions, "The equilibrium" section investigates the effects of changing policy parameters on the equilibrium environment as well as on the voluntary policy to contribute for preserving natural environment.
"Dynamic property" section analyzes the stability properties of the dynamic system and investigates the linkages between the stability properties and the policy instruments. Finally, "Concluding remarks" section gives the summary of the paper. T% of the total foreign aid for the domestic capital formation (K2) and the remains for the environmental preservation (Z2). Using Eqs. (1)- (3) and (5), the total capital accumulation of the related country is given by
BASIC MODEL
Moreover some simple manipulations lead us to the total expenditure related to the environmental preservation, given by Z Z1 --1-Z2 Z1 + TflAK m4K + T,AK (to -t-"yO)AK,
Y=AK,
where K(= ZI/Y), the ratio of domestic preservation to tWirl (1999a, b) are good examples of applicability of Dockner's method for the dynamic system.
*In this paper we do not mention to the international trade among countries. In this connection, see Rauscher (1994) and Barbier & Rausher (1994 (1999)).
In the model economy, we are thinking of LDCs where the social planner pursues the rapid economic growth without deteriorating the natural environment. To accomplish this purpose, the social planner must control some policy variables including the spending from foreign aid towards preserving its natural environment. Because an additional unit of spending for the environmental preservation can actually lead to a conservation of the natural environment, it is very natural to feature an environmental preservation function given by
where G shows the index of effectiveness of the spending, in terms of natural environmental stock, on preserving the natural environment through investment for the ecotechnology or greening development.
On the other side, it is also easy to imagine that if the government does not support a sufficient expenditure to the environmental preservation, the natural environment may be deteriorated. Hence it can be justified that the natural environment is harmfully deteriorated as the spending for natural preservation decreases, leading to D=D(cZ/K), DI<0, D">0 (9) where D shows the index of the damage control. The Eq. (9) shows that the greater the relative size of total spending for environmental protection with respect to capital stock is, the damage control can be more successively effective.
Putting Eqs. (8) and (9) together into consideration, we reach a reproduction function of the natural environment, shown as (10) The first term of the r.h.s of Eq. (10), that is H(R ), shows the natural rate of regeneration of the natural environment while the second and the third term together show the net damage to regenerate through the economic activities in LDCs. It must be justified to assume that in the process of economic activity, people in LDCs tend to provide the negative effects on natural environment so that the net damage defined by D G is always positive.
AN OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
It can be true that the patterns of optimal policy depend on how the social planner of the country takes its policy objectives. We shall here employ the simplest formula of the social welfare function given by the following quasilinear utility function:
U--logC + r/R. (11) In Eq. (11), it is clear that social welfare depends positively on the per capita consumption as well as on the natural environment. People in this country assign a weight 7 to the natural environment. An increase in use of natural resources leads to more private consumption and thus a higher level of economic welfare. However it must have an adverse effect on future social welfare because the stock of the natural resources decreases and the quality of natural environment deteriorates.
The objective function to be maximized by the social planner in the country and the related conditions are -pt dt max{C, 0 (12) subject to Eqs. (6) and (10) and K(0) K0 and R(0) R0 and 0 _-< K _-< 1 where p is a positive social discount rate. The optimal policy follows from maximization of inter-temporal social welfare with respect to C as well as K.
where the co-state variables A and b are the shadow prices of the man-made capital stock and the social value of the natural environmental stock, respectively.
Necessary conditions for optimality are:
OH/OK -AAK + dp
The development of the capital stock and the natural environment can be described by the following differential This leads us to an additional condition to be presumed. Because/Y < 0 and G > 0, there must be some (Z/K)max above which D G becomes nelative. We assume that (ZIK)max is sufficiently large that D G is accepted to be positive.
"The choice of the control variables itself depends on the behavior of the social planner in LDCs. It is easy to assume that another set of variables can be chosen politically to pursue a social optimality. For example, the set of{ C,y} can be a candidate for the control variables. As far as this case is concerned, it is easy to show that all the conditions for optimality of the system are identical with those given by Eqs. (14)- (17 
t--,
The Eqs. (21) and (24) together lead to the long-run equilibrium condition:
This is the simplest form of the consumption-capital ratio. 
The r.h.s of Eq. (27) 
dK*/d3'= -/3 < 0.
In addition, the effect of changes in 3' on the long-run economic growth rate, g can be given by dg/d3" 0.
Equations (30)- (32) leads us to an interesting proposition, implying that under the optimal control policy given by Eq. (12) followed by the government of LDCs, a policy change in terms of domestic voluntary quota of outlays to natural preservation has no effect on the long-run economic growth rate. In the long-run equilibrium, the policy planner can preserve the level of natural environment from being deteriorated even in the case of decrease in 3'. This is because the positive effects via an increase in domestic investment, which is voluntarily planned for protecting domestic natural environment, should offset the negative effects on natural environment through a decrease in quota from foreign assistance. In so far as the social planner follows the optimal policy rule, a change is in 3' will not affect the long-run equilibrium. An increase in /3, the rate of foreign aid to the domestic income of a under developing economy, has the following impacts on the long-run equilibrium conditions given by dR*/d/3 0, 
Equation (33) dg/dr/< 0.
(38)
Because it seems to be the case that the social planners of LDCs would like to avoid a decrease in economic growth rate, it must be difficult for them to accept a greater r/. Equation (38) implies a trade-off between economic growth and environmental preservation for LDCs. To improve the natural environmental quality or to increase the stock of natural environment, people need a voluntary development of the preference pattern towards ecoconsciousness. In this case, however, they are forced to have a diminishing economic growth. Hence the following proposition will hold that a contributor of the foreign assistance must employ an adequate level of/3 (increase in /3) in the case where people tend to be more environmentfriendly (increasing in r/). Therefore it would be justified **By a comparative static procedure, we have the following equations for dR and d?:
Hence it is easy to see that if 1 0, we obtain dR/drl (G alY)Rp/(ff H") and dK/dr/= -ffRp(h H")A. As mentioned before about the shape of regeneration function of the natural environment, it may be reasonable to accept H < h < 0, leading to dR/d > 0 and d/dr/> 0 for sufficiently small that more foreign aid should be financed when the people of LDCs change their voluntary policy pattern towards environmental preservation.
In this section we shall investigate the stability properties of the dynamic system composed by two state variables, K and R and two co-state variables, A and b. By using Eqs. (14) and (15), a simple manipulation yields
and (40) It should be noted that in Eq. (40), K, the preservationoutput ratio, is shown as a reduced form with respect to four endogenous variables, K,R,A and b as well as the It should be noted that in the long-run equilibrium, from Eqs. (16), (22), (23) and (29), we obtain / =-, g, /--= 0.
These conditions characterize the steady state of the system S. To analyze the stability property of the system S by means of local stability analysis, we shall consider the linearized system around the steady state. The Jacobian matrix of S evaluated at the steady state is (see right-hand column for equation (48) . 
Then the system can be summed up in the following dynamic system, S, for the optimal solutions.
where A and are the sum of the principle minors of J of dimension 2 and 3, respectively. Equation (50) can be solved for four eigenvalues, Pi, 1,2, 3, 4. To accomplish our task here we shall apply a method developed by Dockner (1985) by which the stability properties of the linearized optimal dynamics with fourdimensional state and co-state variables can be investigated in a single way. Following his procedure leads us to the formula related to J: 
where tr J and det J, respectively, represent the trace and determinant of J. The determinant of J can be explicitly calculated of the form;
Hence it is easy to find that in the steady state of the system S, detJ must be zero because pK C-= 1/A is assured from Eqs. (25) 
In relation to Eq. (55), it is also notable that A(0)= -0102 < 0 and A(01 + p/2) Amax. Dockner (1985) has also explicitly derived a simple formula for the eigenvalues of the system. Following his procedure we obtain
1= 2-2
By taking the eigenvalues given in Eq. (58) and detJ 0 into consideration, it is easy to reach the following result related to four eigenvalues: (55), we obtain the quadratic relation between A and r//b depicted as in Fig. 1 . Figure 1 shows how the instability property of system S depends on the level of r/for a given 4). Note that the conditional stability can be assured when r/is sufficiently small or, on the contrary, sufficiently large. As mentioned before, r/ means the level of eco-consciousness of the people. If the people living in LDCs have just started to think of preserving the natural environment, one may suppose that 7 still remains so small. If this is the case in germ of economic development process, the social planner can accomplish its goals for sustainable development along the dynamic optimal control program. Then the contributors had better increase the level of foreign assistance to LDCs. However, if it is not the case, the social planner of this country should not follow the dynamic control policy investigated in this paper. Accordingly it leads to our major conclusion that whether the optimal control policy pursued by the social planner of LDCs is feasible or not is mostly dependent on the people's consciousness towards natural environment.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have extended a new model framework of foreign assistance policy in context of the dynamic optimal control and investigated the economic consequences of foreign aid policy for LDCs that have received some financial support from abroad. The model framework features a specific behavior of the social planner who determines the level of voluntary expenditure for preservation of natural environment. In general, more financial needs for natural environmental protection leads to less allowance of growth-oriented investment. Therefore the social planner is always forced to confront a kind of trade-off between economic growth and the environmental preservation. To incorporate this problem into a model analysis clearly, we have built a dynamic model with two control variables: per-capita consumption and voluntary expenditure for natural environment.
As far as the long-run equilibrium is concerned, we have proved that in order to reach a better situation of natural environment, people in LDCs need a voluntary development of the eco-consciousness. Because this leads to declining of the rate of economic growth, it may be justified that more foreign aid for domestic economic growth should be financed. By investigating some stability properties of the dynamic system, we have also reached an interesting proposition that the feasibility and effectiveness of the optimal control policy pursued by the social planner of LDCs depends on the people's consciousness towards natural environment. This also implies that as far as the eco-consciousness is concerned, a halfway position may be worse for the optimal control policy.
